

U.S. Foreign Policy: Our Broader Strategy

file R
Sanctions

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Following is a statement by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, 1980.

I welcome the opportunity to join with you in looking beyond immediate events to America's overall posture and purposes in the world.

For the past 4 months, our primary concern has been drawn to an area of immediate crisis—southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Terrorism in Iran and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan have required concentrated attention. But even as we address these current challenges, we must constantly place our response to specific events within our broader strategy. Our present actions must not only meet immediate crises; they must advance our long-term interests as well.

Over the past several years I have met with the committee many times on specific elements of our foreign policy. These hearings offer an opportunity to consider America's wide-ranging interests, how they relate to each other, and our overall course.

I hope these hearings can also serve another purpose: to help crystallize broad agreement on the general course that best suits America's interests and needs in the coming decade.

I do not suggest that a full consensus behind a detailed foreign policy is now likely. In a world of extraordinary and growing complexity, a world in which our interests are diverse, we cannot escape choices which in their nature are the stuff of controversy.

But I do believe that despite differ-

ences on decisions that we have made and that we and others will make during the 1980s, our nation can now shape a new foreign policy consensus about our goals in the world and the essential strands of our strategy to pursue them.

This consensus can be built around agreement on two central points.

- First, the United States must maintain a military balance of power. Our defense forces must remain unsurpassed. Our strategic deterrent must be unquestionable. Our conventional forces must be strong enough and flexible enough to meet the full range of military threats we may face. As a global power, we must maintain the global military balance. Our strength is important to our own safety, to a strong foreign policy free from coercion, to the confidence of allies and friends, and to the future of reciprocal arms control and other negotiations. Our strength also buttresses regional balances that could be upset by the direct or indirect use of Soviet power.

- The second central point is this: that our military strength, while an essential condition for an effective foreign policy, is not in itself a sufficient condition. We must nurture and draw upon our other strengths as well—our alliances and other international ties, our economic resources, our ability to deal with diversity, and our ideals. By drawing fully on these strengths, we can help shape world events now in ways that reduce the likelihood of using military force later. A global American foreign policy can succeed only if it has both these dimensions.

ent Europe, three-fourths for Japan. Loss of this oil would create havoc not only in the world economy but for the security of our alliances.

Our stake in the region, however, involves more than oil. Peace and stability in the area are critical to the future of our friends there and affect the broader peace. Our strength and skill in supporting their independence will demonstrate to them and to others the constancy of our purpose in the world.

• Another condition is the potential for turmoil and instability, caused by tensions between and within nations.

• A third condition is the geographic accessibility of this critical region to the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increases and dramatizes the potential threat to the security of nations there and to the world's free access to natural resources and shipping routes.

That is the fact, whatever we may speculate about Soviet aims. For intentions cannot be known with certainty. Even if they could, intentions can change. Our response must be based upon Soviet capabilities and Soviet behavior. To respond firmly to these realities now is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be prudent.

Thus we are moving to deal with a new security situation. We have increased our own naval presence there and we are working with others on access to additional air and naval facilities in the region. We are consulting with others on steps to reinforce the deterrence to any future Soviet aggression.

These steps serve an explicit and unmistakable purpose. As President Carter has said: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

We are also acting to impose a serious and sustained price for the aggression that is being committed against Afghanistan. The steps we have taken—on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, and in other areas—have two purposes.

First, by responding firmly to aggression, we seek to deter it elsewhere. To pursue business as usual in the face of aggression is to tempt new adventures or risk miscalculation.

Detente cannot be divorced from deterrence. To oppose aggression now is to promote peace in the future—to foster the conditions for progress in East-West relations. To assume that we can obtain the benefits of detente while ignoring the

need for deterrence would be short-sighted and dangerous. To assume that detente is desirable, that aggression need be met only when it directly threatens one's own region, could encourage aggression elsewhere.

Deterrence requires sacrifice. The United States is willing to bear its share. It is vital that the burden of sacrifice be shared among all our allies—for the sake of peace, for the sake of our alliances, and for the sake of the public support which makes those alliances strong.

The Soviet invasion is not only a challenge to our interests but to those of our allies as well. While there should be a division of labor, it must be an equitable one.

We do not seek nor are we asking our allies to dismantle the framework of East-West relations. We do ask that they take measures designed to deter the Soviets from new adventures that could produce new crises. It is important that we and our allies stand together in our condemnation of aggression.

This firm stand also serves a second purpose: the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

Western pressures do not stand alone. The Soviet actions have been swiftly and strongly condemned by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. The Soviets are facing a staunch, broadly based Afghan resistance. These factors all combine to impose a continuing cost on the Soviets for their aggression.

We also support efforts to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan, with a government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops, we would join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of true neutrality and of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Let me be clear that so long as Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan, the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force. We see no sign of Soviet withdrawal. The evidence is of a continuing buildup.

Let me be equally clear, however, that our intention is to remove the sanctions when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan. This would include the tighter criteria we announced last week governing exceptions from controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union. However, the changes we have proposed in the list of items to be controlled would, if adopted by the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy (COCOM), remain in place: such changes were being considered even before the invasion of Afghanistan, as nec-

essary to promote Western security interests and to reflect the state of Soviet technology.

• We will reiterate our firm position opposing participation at the Moscow Olympics. The February deadline has passed.

Our response to the immediate situation is part of our long-term strategy in the region, as we work with others toward a cooperative security framework. Our purpose is not to dominate any nation; our purpose is to help the nations of the region preserve their independence and build their strength so that they can resist domination by others.

We advance this objective in several ways.

• We are persisting in our efforts for peace in that broad region. A comprehensive settlement between Israel and her neighbors remains a paramount American goal. It would strengthen the security of Israel, to which we remain unshakably committed. It would enhance the security of Israel's neighbors and the stability of the region as a whole.

In South Asia, mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan harm the security of both and heighten the regional danger. We will continue to support their efforts to resolve the issues dividing them. We seek good relations with both. Our assistance to either one is not directed at the other.

• We are working with the nations of the region to foster their economic progress and political stability. The condition inviting internal disorder cannot be remedied by military force. They can be met as governments move to meet the expectations of their people in their own ways and within their own traditions.

• We are strengthening the basis for security cooperation in the region—through military assistance, through access to facilities, and through our increased presence. We have reaffirmed in these new circumstances our commitment to the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation with Pakistan. The nature of our economic and security assistance will depend both on Pakistan's assessment of its needs and our own resource capabilities.

• Finally, we seek to improve our relations with nations throughout the area wherever there is a basis of shared interests. Our diplomacy is grounded in support for the independence of others and respect for their traditions and concerns.

I have concentrated on our approach in this one area because of its immediate importance and because it illustrates a

